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 WHAT WAS HE THINKING? MENS REA’S 
DETERRENT EFFECT ON MACHINEGUN 
POSSESSION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 924(C) 
Stephanie Power+ 
I’m concerned about a [racial epithet] who thinks it’s wise to come to 
a business transaction with automatic weapons. . . .  For his own good, 
tell Bruce Lee and the Karate Kids none of us are carrying automatic 
weapons.  Because here, in this country, it don’t add inches to your 
[anatomical term], you get a life sentence for it.1 
 
Although mistaken about the sentence, as Frank Costello, Jack Nicholson’s 
character in The Departed, explained, carrying a machinegun is a crime in itself 
in the right context.2  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) imposes a thirty-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for using, carrying, or possessing a machinegun 
during the commission of or in relation to a federal crime of violence or a drug-
trafficking crime—regardless of whether the perpetrator actually knew the 
firearm was a machinegun.3  While some courts have held that § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) 
does not require proof of knowledge of the firearm’s characteristics,4 others have 
questioned the validity of this determination.5 
Common law principles require, with few exceptions, that all crimes be 
defined in light of a strong presumption favoring mens rea.6  However, federal 
crimes are “creatures of statute,” and thus Congress has the prerogative to create 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2007, Macalester College.  The author wishes to thank Professor Wagner for his invaluable 
guidance.  The author also wishes to thank her friends and family for their patience and support.  
Finally, the author would like to thank those of her Catholic University Law Review colleagues 
that expended valuable time and effort working on this Comment for their contributions. 
 1. THE DEPARTED (Warner Bros. Pictures 2006). 
 2. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). 
 4. See United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (requiring no additional 
proof of mens rea), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1459 (2013). 
 5. See id. at 528 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (disagreeing emphatically with the majority’s 
holding and arguing that the government should have to prove that the defendant knew what type 
of firearm he possessed); see infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 6. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (explaining that “[t]he 
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or 
transient notion.  It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of 
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good 
and evil”). 
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and define them.7   Congress may choose not to require mens rea for a particular 
crime, regardless of common law rules.8  As a result, some suggest 
Congressional authority to define crimes should be limited by adopting the 
common law’s mens rea presumption.9 
Section 924(c)’s machinegun provision acts as a microcosm in which to 
examine the limitation debate because the provision does not contain an explicit 
mens rea requirement.10  Consequently, courts interpreting the statute disagree 
on the proper construction of § 924(c) and questions remain as to whether the 
provision requires the government to prove knowledge of the firearm’s type.11  
Since the Supreme Court redefined the boundaries of the debate in 2010, two 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that § 924(c) does not require actual 
knowledge.12  In contrast, three circuits have assumed, arguendo, that 
knowledge is required.13  Although no circuit split currently exists, the potential 
for a split is present.14 
The machinegun provision’s lack of mens rea raises two questions: first, 
whether Congress intended to exclude a mens rea requirement from the statute’s 
definition,15 and second, whether including a mens rea requirement serves the 
 7. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)); see also Marvin Zalman, The Federal Anti-Riot Act and Political 
Crime: The Need for Criminal Law Theory, 20 VILL. L. REV. 897, 926 (1975) (“[C]rime is what 
the state outlaws.”). 
 8. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406 (1980) (noting that common law principles 
are subordinate to congressional intent); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) 
(“While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the 
indictment and proof of every crime . . . there has been a modification of this view in respect to 
prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement.”); 
Burwell, 690 F.3d at 508 (observing that “certain offense elements do not require proof of an 
additional mens rea”). 
 9. See, e.g., C. Peter Erlinder, Mens Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a 
Constitutional Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 163, 164 (1981) (detailing 
the consequences of the failure to consistently define the term “crime”). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006); see Burwell, 690 F.3d at 512 (noting that the 
machinegun provision does not contain an explicit mens rea requirement). 
 11. Compare Burwell, 690 F.3d at 516 (holding that the government need not prove 
knowledge of the firearm characteristic); United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1723 (2013); with United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 
1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003) (assuming, without deciding, that the government must prove the 
defendant’s knowledge of the firearm type); United States v. Rodriguez, 54 F. App’x. 739, 747 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2001) (same). 
 12. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 516 (D.C. Circuit); Haile, 685 F.3d at 1218 (Eleventh Circuit). 
 13. See Franklin, 321 F.3d at 1240 (Ninth Circuit); Rodriguez, 54 F. App’x at 747 (Third 
Circuit); Dixon, 273 F.3d at 640–41 (Fifth Circuit). 
 14. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 511 (noting specifically the “possibility of a future circuit split”). 
 15. See infra Part I.B. (explaining that congressional intent controls and, therefore, that courts 
are responsible for interpreting statutes in which mens rea is ambiguous or absent to determine 
whether Congress intentionally omitted a mens rea requirement). 
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statute’s underlying deterrent purpose.16  If Congress fails to expressly include 
mens rea in a criminal statute or if it is unclear to which elements a mens rea 
term applies, courts must determine what Congress intended in drafting the 
statute.17  For example, the provision’s legislative history indicates that 
Congress intended § 924(c) to deter offenders from carrying firearms to facilitate 
crimes.18 
Economic theory offers a valuable lens through which to examine whether a 
mens rea requirement serves the deterrent purpose of the law.19  Scholars 
applying economic analysis to legal concepts predominately focus on the 
deterrent value of the laws in question.20  There are two types of economic 
analysis of law: traditional and behavioral.21  Applying both the traditional and 
behavioral frameworks provides a method to examine what deterrent effect 
including a mens rea requirement in the machinegun provision may have on 
potential offenders.22 
Finally, the lack of a mens rea requirement in a statutory crime may also raise 
due process concerns regarding the proportionality of the amount of punishment 
inflicted relative to the level of culpability required to inflict it.23  Some scholars 
suggest that this concern arises in the criminal context when a defendant is 
severely punished for unwittingly committed acts.24 
 16. See infra Part I.D. (discussing the machinegun provision’s deterrent purpose in the context 
of economic efficiency). 
 17. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1994) (quoting Liparota v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (noting that congressional intent controls in interpreting 
ambiguous statutes). 
 18. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998). 
 19. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741 (1993) 
(discussing mens rea from an economic perspective). 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 743 (explaining the basic assumptions and theories underlying economic 
analysis of the law). 
 21. See Russel Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis 
of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 445 (2004).  The 
traditional, or optimal enforcement, theory offers a limited framework for analyzing deterrence by 
applying economic theory under a rigid set of assumptions about human behavior to roughly 
determine the “optimal levels” of punishment and enforcement to reduce crime.  See infra Part II.A.  
Behavioral economic analysis offers a somewhat more useful framework for evaluating deterrence 
because it modifies some of the assumptions made under traditional theory to create a framework 
that better reflects human behavior.  See infra Part III.B. 
 22. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1473 (discussing crime under the behavioral economic theory); Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1221 (1985) (analyzing criminal 
intent from a traditional economic perspective). 
 23. Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s 
Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 109, 110 (2012). 
 24. See id. at 110–11; see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, 
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005).  Courts have also concluded 
that punishment should be proportionate to guilt.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Valley Steel Prods. Co., 375 
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This Comment considers whether inferring a mens rea requirement from the 
machinegun provision serves § 924(c)’s deterrent purpose.  This Comment also 
analyzes the importance of deterrence in determining congressional intent and 
assessing punitive proportionality of the machinegun provision.  This Comment 
begins by introducing the provision, examining what constitutes a crime, and 
identifying justifications for criminal punishment.  It then discusses mens rea 
and its role in crime deterrance.  Next, this Comment discusses previous the 
judicial interpretations of the provision, considers congressional intent, and 
examines mens rea from an economic perspective.  Finally, this Comment 
concludes that imposing a mens rea requirement for the firearm-characteristics 
element of the machinegun provision serves the deterrent purpose of the statute.  
This Comment proposes that courts should interpret the machinegun provision 
consistently with congressional intent and proportionality by requiring specific 
knowledge of the firearm’s characteristics or, in the alternative, that Congress 
should amend the provision to include a specific knowledge requirement. 
I.  DETERMINING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT ABSENT AN EXPLICIT MENS REA 
REQUIREMENT 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) applies if a defendant uses or carries a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense or possesses a 
firearm in furtherance of such an offense.25  A defendant may receive a 
mandatory minimum sentence of between five and thirty years for violating  
§ 924(c)(1), depending on his specific actions and the type of firearm 
possessed.26 
The machinegun provision, § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), imposes the highest penalty 
under § 924(c)(1).27  The machinegun provision provides that, “[i]f the firearm 
possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection . . . is a 
machinegun . . . the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
N.E.2d 1297, 1305 (Ill. 1978) (“It would be unthinkable to subject a person to a long term of 
imprisonment for an offense he might commit unknowingly.”). 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006).  The statute reads, in relevant part: 
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an 
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or 
device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in 
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime 
. . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years. 
Id. 
 26. See  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (imposing a minimum seven-year sentence if the firearm 
is “brandished”); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (imposing a minimum ten-year sentence if the 
firearm is discharged); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) (imposing a minimum ten-year sentence if the 
firearm is semi-automatic); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (imposing a minimum thirty-year sentence 
if the firearm is a machinegun). 
 27. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (mandating a minimum thirty-year sentence). 
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less than 30 years.”28  Courts have used the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation to determine whether the common law presumption against strict 
liability should apply to this provision.29  Understanding the role mens rea plays 
in the American criminal justice system and its function as a definitional tool is 
important to this inquiry.30 
A.  Mens Rea Theoretically Ensures That Only the Criminally Culpable Are 
Punished 
Punishment, the consequence of violating social duties, should only be 
inflicted upon those deserving of it.31  A crime is “a breach and violation of the 
public rights and duties, due to the whole community” that results in social 
harm.32  Each crime traditionally requires both an act (actus reus) and intent to 
do that act (mens rea).33  A criminal conviction—the embodiment of criminal 
punishment34—is the means by which society condemns the breach of social 
duties.35  Because criminal punishment is an expression of social condemnation, 
 28. Id.  This provision also applies to “destructive device[s]” and firearms “equipped with a 
firearm silencer or firearm muffler.”  Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 124 (2000). 
 30. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1951) (emphasizing the importance 
of mens rea). 
 31. See Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1980) (“It is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that punishment entails blame 
and that, therefore, punishment may not justly be imposed where the person is not blameworthy.”); 
see also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4–5 (1968) (delineating five 
characteristics of criminal punishment: “(1) It must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant[;] (2) It must be for an offence against legal rules[;] (3) It must be of an 
actual or supposed offender for his offence[;] (4) It must be intentionally administered by human 
beings other than the offender[; and] (5) It must be imposed and administered by an authority 
constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed.”). 
 32. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
KNIGHT, ON THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 362 (ABA ed. 2009); see also Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958) (defining a 
crime as “conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community”).  Notably, the Constitution does 
not define what constitutes a crime.  Louis D. Bilionis, Process, The Constitution, and Substantive 
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1277 (1998). 
 33. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 10 (4th ed. 2003); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, 
Act, Intention, and Motive in Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 646–47 (1917) (discussing the 
difficulty of defining what constitutes an “act” and “intent” because of the ambiguous nature of 
both terms, which has resulted in a multitude of possible interpretations). 
 34. See Hart, supra note 32, at 404–05.  Criminal conviction embodies “the expression of the 
community’s hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict.”  George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson 
and the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 193 (1953). 
 35. See Hart, Jr., supra note 32, at 405; see also Blackstone, supra note 32, at 362 (defining 
criminal punishment as “evils or inconveniences consequent upon crimes and misdemeanors; being 
devised, denounced, and inflicted by human laws, in consequence of disobedience or misbehavior 
in those, to regulate whose conduct such laws were respectively made”). 
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an actor should only be punished when the actor is deserving of it.36  However, 
the justifications for criminal punishment are complex and cannot be confined 
to a singularly punitive purpose.37 
An effective criminal justice system must balance efficiency with the duty to 
punish only the culpable.38  Some scholars suggest that, instead of punishment, 
the primary objective of criminal law should be to minimize social harm by 
encouraging or discouraging certain behavior.39  A crime’s mens rea 
requirement serves both of these functions by ensuring that only those culpable 
of the crime are punished.40  Yet, under American jurisprudence, there are 
circumstances in which an offender’s mens rea is disregarded.41 
 36. Kadish, supra note 31, at 10 (“It is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that 
punishment entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may not justly be imposed where the 
person is not blameworthy.”). 
 37. See HART, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that the concept of punishment is innately complex 
because “different principles (each of which may in a sense be called a ‘justification’) are relevant 
at different points in any morally acceptable account of punishment”); see also Hart, supra note 32, 
at 401 (explaining that the complexity of social goals requires a system that balances multiple 
values and thus “[a] penal code that reflected only a single basic principle would be a very bad 
one”).  There are four commonly recognized justifications for inflicting punishment on those who 
commit criminal acts: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and reform.  See Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some 
Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).  Under a retributivist theory when a person 
inflicts social harm by breaking the law, society justifies punishing him as a form of vengeance or 
as a means of restoring social equilibrium.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 
17–18 (5th ed. 2009).  Deterrence, incapacitation, and reform are all forms of utilitarian 
punishment, which seeks to prevent future harm.  Id. at 14–15.  Classic utilitarian theory reasons 
that an individual will “avoid criminal activity if the perceived . . . punishment outweighs the 
expected” benefit.  Id.  Under a deterrence theory, an individual is punished in order to warn that 
offender and any potential future offenders of the consequences of such action.  Id. at 15.  Under 
an incapacitation theory, a person is imprisoned primarily to prevent him from committing future 
criminal acts.  Id.  Reformation theory considers punishment, usually in the form of imprisonment, 
as a means of correcting undesirable behaviors, thereby preventing future criminal activity.  Id. 
 38. See Hart, supra note 32, at 408–09.  Some scholars suggest that no single goal or value 
justifying criminal law can accomplish this objective.  See, e.g., id. at 406 (quoting LIVINGSTON 
HALL & SHELDON GLICK, CASES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 19 (3d ed. 
1958)).  For example, H.L:A. Hart suggests that, although punishing a person who did not commit 
the charged crime may deter others from acting, this punishment instills uncertainty, unrest, and 
distrust in the population, which can ultimately break down the system.  HART, supra note 31, at 
20–21.  Nonetheless, H.M. Hart suggests that a system in which punishment is solely retrospective 
fails to take advantage of the opportunity to prospectively deter or eliminate behavior that results 
in social harm.  Hart, supra note 32, at 408–09. 
 39. See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
 40. See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 117 (noting that courts generally “require proof that the 
person charged with a criminal offense had a culpable state of mind”). 
 41. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 305–06 (1980) (citing United States v. Foal, 
420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975)) (recognizing that Congress can dispense with a mens rea requirement if 
it intends to do so); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–07 (1994) (explaining that 
the mens rea presumption does not apply to public welfare crimes). 
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1.  Mens Rea Embodies Criminal Law’s Fault Requirement 
The mens rea principle ensures that a defendant will only be found guilty if 
he possessed a mind correspondingly guilty to the act he committed.42  Mens rea 
refers to the intention with which an individual commits a criminal act.43  A 
criminal act is intentional if the individual intends the result of his actions by 
either desiring the result or knowing that the result is practically certain to occur 
from his actions, regardless of his desire to cause it.44  Intent generally 
encompasses knowledge.45  Therefore, criminal mens rea refers to the desire to 
produce a specific result, the knowledge that a particular result will almost 
certainly ensue from the actor’s conduct, or both.46 
Despite the well-established nature of mens rea as a protective doctrine, courts 
have failed to require it as an essential element in American criminal 
jurisprudence.47  Courts have consistently acknowledged that, in decreasingly 
limited instances, Congress may dispense with a mens rea requirement in favor 
of strict liability.48  However, Congress’s power to define crimes is not 
 42. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); see also United States v. U. S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (noting that Morissette established “an interpretative 
presumption that mens rea is required”).  Mens rea is so entrenched in criminal jurisprudence that 
one scholar noted “the requirement of mens rea contributes to the meaning and value of our lives 
as moral beings.”  Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 61 
(2003). 
 43. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009) (defining mens rea as “[t]he state of 
mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing 
a crime; criminal intent or recklessness”).  Scholars summarize the mens rea principle with Latin 
phrase “[a]ctus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” (“‘an act does not make [a person] guilty, unless 
the mind be guilty’”).  DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 117. 
 44. Cook, supra note 33, at 657–58. 
 45. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (specifying four forms of mens rea).  The Model Penal 
Code (MPC) divides intent into two separate terms: “purposely” and “knowingly.”   
§ 2.02(2)(a) & (b). The MPC also identifies two additional forms of culpability: recklessness and 
negligence.  § 2.02(c) & (d).  Of the four forms of mens rea, “knowingly” is the most common in 
criminal statutes.  Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 895, 897 
(2000). 
 46. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 244. 
 47. Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107 (1962) 
(“Mens rea is an important requirement, but is not a constitutional requirement. . . .”).  Scholars 
have attempted to define mens rea requirements a substantive constitutional right by using a 
penumbras and emanations theory similar to Justice Douglas’s argument in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.  See Bilionis, supra note 32, at 1284–85 (citing 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) (explaining that 
the Supreme Court has not embraced this theory). 
 48. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (citing United States v. Hudson, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)) (acknowledging that it is the prerogative of the legislature to define 
the elements of a federal crime); see also Bilionis, supra note 32, at 1288 (explaining that strict 
liability has been an accepted part of Supreme Court jurisprudence since the Court decided Shevlin-
Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota in 1910).  A strict liability crime is a crime that does not contain a 
mens rea requirement, thereby criminalizing conduct regardless of the actor’s mindset while 
committing it.  See United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437–38 (1978). 
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absolutely unlimited.49  The courts have intervened in situations in which 
Congress has failed to adequately define the mental element of a crime.50 
B.  The Common Law Mens Rea Presumption Only Applies to Federal Crimes 
in Certain Situations 
With the exception of public welfare offenses,51 courts presume mens rea is 
an element of a crime absent a manifestation of congressional intent to the 
contrary.52  At a minimum, courts require “some indication of congressional 
intent, express or implied” to dispense with a mens rea requirement.53  If “some 
indication” of congressional intent exists, that intent controls, regardless of the 
common law presumption.54  However, this principle does not apply if a 
statutory element criminalizes “otherwise innocent conduct.”55  If this happens, 
courts will apply the mens rea presumption and attach a mens rea requirement 
to the requisite element.56  If the element does not criminalize conduct that 
would be otherwise innocent, courts typically avoid reading new elements into 
the statute.57 
 49. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618–19 (1994) (noting that courts may infer a 
mens rea requirement if Congress has not manifested an intent to omit it). 
 50. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); see also Staples, 511 U.S. at 605–
06 (explaining that offenses defined without a mens rea element are disfavored and “some 
indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with [it] as an element 
of a crime.”); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424–25 (rejecting an interpretation of a statute that resulted in 
the criminalization of conduct that would be otherwise innocent). 
 51. Public welfare crimes are strict liability crimes that are generally permitted only in the 
limited circumstances in which the offense is regulatory in nature.  See Staples, 511 U.S. at  
606–07 (noting that public welfare statutes may not contain a mens rea requirement); Liparota, 471 
U.S. at 433 (explaining that public welfare offenses generally criminalize “conduct that a 
reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten 
the community’s health or safety”); see also Brown, supra note 23, at 109–10 (explaining that 
imposing liability without mens rea is justified “on instrumental grounds—prevention of  
harm—and on proof (generally, in some sense) of a causal relationship between the actor and the 
risk that the offense targets”). 
 52. See United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437 (1978) (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 
263); see also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (noting that, at common law, 
mens rea was typically necessary for all crimes even if it was not expressly included in the statute). 
 53. Staples, 511 U.S. at 606. 
 54. Id. 
 55. U. S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994) (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 
260) (explaining that, under Court precedent, the mens rea presumption applies to “each of the 
statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct”). 
 56. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 
72) (noting that the common law presumption requires courts to infer mens rea terms from a statute 
only if it is “necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct’”). 
 57. See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009) (quoting Bates v. United States, 
522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)) (refusing to infer a mens rea requirement from the discharge provision 
under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), in part because the Court disfavors reading words or elements into a 
statute). 
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If a federal criminal statute lacks a mens rea requirement, courts interpreting 
the statute must employ tools of statutory interpretation to determine if the 
omission was intentional.58  To determine congressional intent, courts 
traditionally look to the statutory “language, structure, context, history, and such 
other factors that typically help to determine a statute’s objectives.”59  Courts 
generally conclude that Congress did not intend to dispense with a mens rea 
requirement if the omission results in injustice.60  If a federal statute does not 
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, the question becomes whether Congress 
intended to create a strict liability offense through its silence on mens rea.61  In 
conducting this analysis, courts must consider whether the offense or its 
elements are generally viewed as the type properly subject to strict liability.62 
C.  It Is Unclear Whether the Government Must Prove a Defendant Knew the 
Type of Firearm Used Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) 
1.  Supreme Court Precedent Does Not Address Intent Corresponding to 
Firearm-Type 
While the Supreme Court has declined to comment on the machinegun 
provision’s mens rea debate, the Court has addressed whether the weapon type 
is an element of the crime, rather than a sentencing factor.63  This distinction is 
important because establishing a provision as an element of a crime arguably 
imposes a higher burden of proof on the government than establishing it as a 
sentencing factors.64  Ultimately, the Court has concluded that the weapon type 
constitutes an element of the crime, first under the 1988 version of the statute in 
 58. Staples, 511 U.S. at 604–05. 
 59. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 124 (2000) (construing a prior version of  
§ 924(c)(1)). 
 60. Staples, 511 U.S. at 606. 
 61. See X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 72 (explaining that, under Supreme Court 
precedent, the mens rea presumption applies to “each of the statutory elements that criminalize 
otherwise innocent conduct”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405–06 (1980) (citing United 
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975)) (explaining that not all elements require a corresponding 
intent requirement). 
 62. The mens rea presumption does not apply to public welfare offenses.  See supra notes 51–
52 and accompanying text.  If a crime is a public welfare offense and contains no mens rea 
requirement (explicit or implicit), the mens rea presumption does not apply and the court 
automatically concludes Congress did not intend to require proof of mens rea.  See Staples, 511 
U.S. at 606. 
 63. See United States v. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2172 (2010). 
 64. Id. at 2174.  The government must prove elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 
whereas sentencing factors can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. (citing Hamling 
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)) (noting that the burden of proof for elements is beyond 
a reasonable doubt); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91–92 (1986) (holding that the burden 
of proof for sentencing factors is by a preponderance of the evidence). 
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Castillo v. United States,65 and again under the current version of the statute in 
United States v. O’Brien.66  In both cases, the Court considered five factors 
aimed at discerning congressional intent to make its determination:  
“(1) language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) risk of unfairness, (4) severity of 
the sentence, and (5) legislative history.”67  In Castillo, the Court held that the 
weapon-type language of the machinegun provision “refer[s] to an element of a 
separate, aggravated crime” beyond the basic crime defined by 18 U.S.C.  
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i).68  The Court found that all five factors supported this 
conclusion, although it noted that the legislative history was not particularly 
instructive.69 
The O’Brien Court reached the same conclusion under the amended statute.70  
Although the Court explained that the structure of the amended statute treated 
the machinegun provision more like a sentencing factor than an element of the 
crime,71 it nonetheless found that the “substantial weight” of the other Castillo 
factors and the lack of clear congressional intent to treat the amended provision 
differently outweighed the effect of the structural change.72  Although the Court 
determined that the weapon type was an element of the § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) 
offense, it explicitly refused to resolve the separate question of whether the 
government must prove mens rea with respect to the weapon type.73  That 
question depends on a separate showing of congressional intent.74 
 65. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 121 (2000).  Most of the jurisprudence considering 
the weapon-specific knowledge issue pre-dates the Supreme Court’s determination in O’Brien.  
See, e.g., United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
1459 (2013); United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 812 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Franklin, 
321 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rodriguez, 54 F. App’x 739, 747 (3d Cir. 
2002); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Eads, 191 
F.3d 1206, 1212–14 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 66. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. at 2180. 
 67. Id. at 2175 (citing Castillo, 530 U.S. at 124–31). 
 68. Castillo, 530 U.S. at 131. 
 69. Id. at 124–31. 
 70. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. at 2180. 
 71. Id. (noting that the amended statute moved the machinegun language to a separate 
subsection located between the discharge and brandishing sentencing factors and the recidivist 
provisions, which are also considered to be sentencing factors). 
 72. Id. at 2179–80 (“This structural or stylistic change, though, does not provide a clear 
indication that Congress meant to alter its treatment of machineguns as an offense element.”).  
Although the previous version of the statute was at issue in Castillo, the 1998 amendment took 
effect two years before Castillo was decided.  Id. at 2175. 
 73. Id. at 2173 (explaining that the Court’s holding expressed no opinion regarding the 
“contention that a defendant who uses, carries, or possesses a firearm must be aware of the 
weapon’s characteristic”). 
 74. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (explaining that if a statute lacks an express 
mens rea term, courts must determine whether Congress intended to imply one regardless). 
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2.  Courts Have Held That Various Provisions in the Basic Offense Set Forth 
in § 924(c)(1) Require Evidence of Mens Rea 
Because statutory provisions cannot be read in isolation, looking at the way 
previous courts have treated mens rea requirements for other elements in  
§ 924(c) is instructive in the mens rea inquiry for the machinegun provision.75  
Section 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) creates a substantive crime separate from the root crime 
defined in  
§ 924(c)(1).76  Courts interpreting § 924(c)(1) have found that the following 
elements have corresponding mens rea requirements: (1) “during and in relation 
to . . . uses or carries;” (2) “in furtherance of . . . possesses;” (3) “crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime;” and (4) a “firearm” (for which 
“machinegun” and other devices are substituted in the machinegun provision).77 
Courts have interpreted the phrase “during and in relation to . . . uses or 
carries” as requiring the firearm to “have some purpose or effect with respect 
to” the underlying offense.78  Although Congress rejected limiting the statute’s 
ambit to active employment of a firearm with the “Bailey Fix Act,”79 courts 
subsequently interpreting the provision have indicated that merely possessing a 
firearm is insufficient to violate the statute.80  These decisions demonstrate that 
 75. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 (1993) (interpreting a previous iteration of the 
statute and explaining that words or provisions of a statute cannot be read without considering their 
context within the whole statute). 
 76. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 77. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) & (B) (2006). 
 78. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 238 (“[I]ts presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident 
or coincidence.”).  Smith was decided before the statute was amended to include the “possession” 
element, but courts continue to follow this requirement.  See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 
U.S. 125, 135 (1998) (interpreting the “carry” portion of the “use or carry” element in a broader, 
yet similar, fashion to include situations in which a defendant knowingly has a firearm in his 
vehicle, as within the scope of the statute); Angela LaBuda Collins, Note, The Latest Amendment 
to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): Congressional Reaction to the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Statute, 
48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1319, 1350 (1999) (explaining that the Muscarello decision was a precursor 
to the 1998 amendment to § 924(c) to include the possession element). 
 79. In United States v. Bailey, the Supreme Court held that, to be convicted under  
§ 924(c)(1), the government must prove that the defendant did more than merely possess a firearm; 
after reviewing “the language, context, and history of § 924(c)(1),” the Court concluded “that the 
Government must show active employment of the firearm.”  516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995), superseded 
by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469–70 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).  In 1998, Congress added the “possession” element to  
§ 924(c) to directly address the Court’s holding in Bailey with what is colloquially known as the 
“Bailey Fix Act”.  See Collins, supra note 78, at 1348–50 (detailing the legislative history behind 
the Bailey Fix Act).  The Bailey Fix Act addressed situations in which the offender only possessed 
the firearm, but still maintained the requisite nexus between the firearm and the underlying offense.  
See id. at 1349–50 (explaining that Congress intended the Bailey Fix Act to expand the scope of § 
924(c)). 
 80. See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court has taken the position that the relational terms in § 924(c) indicate that the use, 
carriage, or possession of the firearm cannot be inadvertent). 
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an offender must have intended to have a firearm in some capacity directly 
related to the underlying offense.81 
Courts have also required mens rea for two additional elements: the intent for 
the underlying offense,82 and knowledge of the firearm itself.83  In United States 
v. Burwell, the Court recognized that the government must prove that the 
defendant carried an object he knew was a firearm.84  Other courts interpreting 
the provision have held or noted the same.85  Based on these interpretations, the 
basic offense provided by § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) requires that a defendant intended 
to possess what he knew was a firearm to facilitate the commission of an 
underlying offense that he intended to commit.86  If the government can prove 
all of the aforementioned elements, the defendant is subject to a mandatory 
minimum five-year prison sentence.87  The question then becomes whether 
Congress intended to subject a defendant to a mandatory-minimum sentence six 
times higher than the root crime’s sentence for unknowingly carrying a specific 
type of firearm under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).88 
3.  Three Circuits Have Suggested that the Machinegun Provision Requires 
Proof of Knowledge of the Gun’s Characteristics 
The Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits have assumed, arguendo, that the 
government must prove that a defendant knew the gun he possessed was a 
machinegun under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).89  In United States v. Franklin, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the “evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find that 
[the defendant] knew the weapon was capable of being fired in an automatic 
 81. See United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied,  
133 S. Ct. 1459 (2013) (holding that the government must “prove that the defendant intentionally 
use or carried a firearm, or intentionally possessed a firearm, during or in furtherance of” the 
underlying offense). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–27 (1998) (explaining that  
§ 924(c)(1) applies to an offender who “knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle” 
(emphasis added)); United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 258–59 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam) 
(noting that the government must show that the offender actually knew that the object he used to 
facilitate the underlying crime was a gun), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stewart, 
246 F.3d 728, 731 (2001). 
 84. See 690 F.3d at 507. 
 85. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (relying on United 
States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 1995)); Harris, 959 F.2d at 258–59 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
 86. See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2009); Burwell, 690 F.3d at 507. 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 88. Compare id. (imposing a mandatory five-year sentence), with 18 U.S.C.  
§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (imposing a mandatory thirty-year sentence). 
 89. See United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 54 F. App’x 739, 747 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636, 640–41 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
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setting.”90  The Third Circuit, in United States v. Rodriguez, held that the trial 
court’s failure to instruct the jury that they must find the defendant knew that he 
carried a machinegun during a robbery was harmless error and “assum[ed] 
without deciding that knowledge [of the machinegun’s characteristics] was 
required.”91  Similarly, in United States v. Dixon, the Fifth Circuit assumed 
without deciding that the defendant’s knowledge of the his weapon’s 
characteristics was an element of the crime defined by § 924(c)(1).92  These 
cases did not require the court determine whether the machinegun provision 
required knowledge of the firearm’s characteristics because it was clear to the 
court in each case that the defendant knew he had carried a machinegun.93 
4.  Two Circuits Have Concluded That the Machinegun Provision Does Not 
Require Proof of Knowledge of the Weapon Type 
The Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the Eleventh 
Circuit have both weighed in on the debate surrounding machinegun provision’s 
mens rea requirement.94  Each court determined that the provision does not 
require proof of knowledge that the defendant’s firearm was a machinegun.95  In 
United States v. Burwell, the D.C. Circuit conducted a thorough statutory 
analysis of the issue, examining the statute’s text, structure and context, purpose, 
sentence severity, and potential to criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.96 
With respect to the provision’s text, the Burwell court explained that the 
grammar used in the provision “telegraphs [congressional] intent to eliminate an 
additional mens rea requirement.”97  The court considered the text’s explicit lack 
of a mens rea requirement and the use of passive voice indicative of Congress’s 
 90. Franklin, 321 F.3d at 1240 (applying a plain error standard of review).  In Franklin, the 
defendant fired the weapon at the police while attempting to escape after robbing a credit union.  
Id.  Machinegun fire is distinctive, as automatic weapons are the only firearms able to fire multiple 
rounds with a single pull of the trigger, producing a “burst” of shots.  North Carolina Gun 
Ownership FAQs, NORTH CAROLINA RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.ncrpa.org/faq/ownership.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
 91. Rodriguez, 54 F. App’x at 747. 
 92. Dixon, 273 F.3d at 640–41. 
 93. See Franklin, 321 F.3d at 1240; Rodriguez, 54 F. App’x at 747; Dixon, 273 F.3d at  
640–41. 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 1459 (2013); United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1723 (2013). 
 95. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 516; Haile, 685 F.3d at 1218. 
 96. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 511–15.  The Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Haile less than 
two months before the Burwell court issued its opinion, but the court simply dismissed the matter 
as a nonissue because of precedent that explicitly “‘does not require proof of particularized 
knowledge of the weapon characteristics.’”  Haile, 685 F.3d at 1218 (quoting United States v. 
Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007)).  Similarly, the Burwell court relied heavily on 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Harris in concluding that the government need not 
show mens rea as to the weapon type.  Burwell, 690 F.3d at 516. 
 97. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 512. 
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intent.98  In examining the structure and context of the machinegun provision, 
the Burwell court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dean v. United 
States.99  Adhering to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,100 the 
court found that, because Congress had included a mens rea requirement in § 
924(c)(1)(A)(ii)—the “brandishing” sentencing factor—but not in the 
machinegun provision, the omission was intentional.101 
In examining the provision’s legislative history, the Burwell court looked 
primarily to the statute’s stated purpose.102  Section 924(c) was enacted as part 
of the Gun Control Act of 1968.103  The provision was meant “to persuade the 
man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home.”104  
The machinegun provision was added to the statute in 1986.105  Congress 
amended the machinegun provision in 1988 to increase the penalty to thirty 
years.106  In 1998, Congress relocated the machinegun provision to its own 
 98. Id. at 510 (quoting Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009) (explaining that 
the statute’s language “refers to a state of being that exists ‘without respect to a specific actor, and 
therefore without respect to any actor’s intent or culpability.’”).  Section 924(c)(1) contains a single 
explicit mens rea requirement located in § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), the “brandish” provision.  See Dean, 
129 S. Ct. at 1853 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (2006)) (“Congress expressly included an intent 
requirement for [the brandish] provision, by defining ‘brandish’ to mean ‘to display all or part of 
the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another person, in order to 
intimidate that person.’”). 
 99. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 512.  In Dean, the Court indicated that omitting language in one 
statutory provision and including it in another related provision is presumed to be intentional.  Id. 
(quoting Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1854). 
 100. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 661–62 (describing expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius as a statutory construction canon that stands for the proposition that holding one 
thing excludes its alternative).  Although the Dean Court did not expressly use the Latin phrase, 
the Court’s reasoning nonetheless reflects this principle.  See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1854. 
 101. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 512. 
 102. Id. at 512-13.  The appellant in Burwell claimed that the statute’s legislative history did 
not provide guidance on the mens rea issue.  See Reply Brief of Appellant on Rehearing En Banc 
at 8 n.1, Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (No. 06-3070).  The government disagreed, arguing that the 
legislative history indicated that Congress intended to omit mens rea from the provision.  See Letter 
from Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to Mark J. Langer, 
Clerk, United States Court of Appeals (Jan. 23, 2012). 
 103. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 404 n.9 (1980), superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 
12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138–39 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c) (2006)). 
 104. 114 CONG. REC. 22,231 (1968)) (statement of Rep. Poff)). 
 105. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, §104(a)(2), 100 Stat. 449,  
456–57 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
 106. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6460(1), 102 Stat. 4181, 4373–74 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)).  The original penalty imposed by the first 
iteration of the machinegun provision was 10 years.  See id. (changing the sentence from ten to 
thirty years). 
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subsection and made the penalty a mandatory minimum sentence.107  The 
Burwell court suggested that the weapon-specific provisions § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) 
and § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) “reflect Congress’s desire to create a deterrent 
commensurate with the increased danger posed by these weapons.”108 
After examining the penalty’s effect on innocent behavior, the Burwell court 
reaffirmed that the machinegun provision “poses no danger of ensnaring ‘an 
altar boy who made an innocent mistake.’”109  The court noted that, because the 
§ 924(c)(1) offenses are predicated on the commission of the underlying felony 
and because the defendant must intentionally carry or possess a firearm as a 
means of facilitating that felony,110 an innocent person would never be convicted 
under the statute.111  In reaching its decision, the court adhered to its position in 
United States v. Harris, concluding that the intent to possess a firearm included 
the intent to possess that firearm’s characteristics and thus the crime could not 
be construed as a public welfare offense lacking a mens rea requirement.112  In 
effect, the Burwell court reasoned that, because the crime contained at least one 
intent element, it was acceptable to impose a more severe penalty under § 
924(c)(1)(B)(ii) without requiring knowledge of the firearm’s characteristics.113 
Three judges dissented in Burwell.114  Judge Kavanaugh strongly objected to 
the majority opinion, arguing that it subjected offenders to higher penalties 
without an adequate showing of intent.115  Judge Kavanaugh rejected the notion 
that, because one of the elements of the crime under § 924(c) is an underlying 
felony with a corresponding mens rea requirement, § 924(c) is absolved of 
requiring additional mens rea for independent provisions.116  He argued that the 
presumption against strict liability requires courts to avoid criminalizing 
otherwise innocent conduct and should also apply to statutes that impose a 
 107. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1(a), 112 Stat. 3469, 3469 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)) (changing the penalty from a mandatory sentence to a mandatory 
minimum sentence by creating a separate penalty provision). 
 108. United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. at 
1459. 
 109. Id. at 513 (quoting United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 110. Id. at 514. 
 111. Id. at 507. 
 112. Id. at 514; Harris, 959 F.2d at 259 (“[T]here does not seem to be a significant difference 
in mens rea between a defendant who commits a drug crime using a pistol and one who commits 
the same crime using a machine gun; the act is different, but the mental state is equally 
blameworthy.”). 
 113. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 514. 
 114. Id. at 502 (The three dissenting judges were Judge Rogers, Judge Kavanaugh, and Judge 
Tatel.). 
 115. Id. at 528 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that, because Congress did not explicitly 
indicate its intent to dispense with mens rea, the government must prove mens rea for each element). 
 116. Id. at 544 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the defendant is a ‘bad person’ 
who has done ‘bad things’ does not justify dispensing with the presumption of mens rea. . . .”). 
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significantly higher penalty for essentially the same level of culpability as a 
lesser-related crime.117 
Judge Kavanaugh premised his dissent, in part, on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United States.118  Kavanaugh suggested that, 
although the machinegun provision does not fit perfectly within the ambit of the 
presumption against strict liability because it is not completely devoid of a mens 
rea requirement, the harsh penalty it inflicts on a potentially unknowing offender 
invokes the spirit of the doctrine.119  He reasoned that an offender could 
 117. Id. at 544–45 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  Kavanaugh argued that it is just as unfair to 
subject a defendant to a twenty-year enhancement in penalty without requiring mens rea as it is to 
punish a defendant under a strict liability statute even though, if mens rea were required, the 
defendant would be innocent.  Id. at 544 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (relying on Flores-Figueroa v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888–89 (2009)).  The majority rejected Judge Kavanaugh’s 
argument on the grounds that neither the machinegun provision nor § 924(c)(1) contains an explicit 
mens rea requirement, unlike the statute at issue in Flores-Figueroa, which did.  Id. at 515.  The 
majority further explained that the Court’s “strongly textual approach” in Flores-Figueroa may 
actually reject the “judicial creation of a mens rea requirement for every element in the face of 
statutory silence.”  Id. at 516; see also Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1894, 1853 (2009) (quoting 
Bates v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)) (refusing to read a mens rea requirement into the 
discharge provision in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)). 
 118. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 516 (overviewing Judge Kavanaugh’s discussion of  
Flores-Figueroa).  Judge Rogers took a slightly different position in her dissent, focusing 
predominately on the severity of the penalty and arguing that its magnitude “requires for conviction 
proof of the defendant’s knowledge that the firearm was a machinegun.” Id. at 520 (Rogers, J., 
dissenting).  The majority rejected Rogers’s approach as “unbounded,” explaining that “a balancing 
test completely unmoored from circuit or Supreme Court precedent—is substantially broader than 
anything we have proposed.”  Id. 
 119. Id. at 529 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  Kavanaugh argued that the Supreme Court has 
never limited the mens rea presumption by applying it only if otherwise innocent conduct is 
criminalized.  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  Instead, he proposed that the presumption can also 
apply “both when necessary to avoid criminalizing apparently innocent conduct . . . and when 
necessary to avoid convicting the defendant of a more serious offense for apparently less serious 
criminal conduct.”  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  The majority predicated its counterargument 
on the fact that the crime proscribed by the machinegun provision already contains two mens rea 
requirements corresponding to other elements.  Id. at 512.  The majority also relied heavily on 
Dean, in which the Supreme Court held that omitting a mens rea requirement in one provision and 
including it in another part of the statute is clear evidence that Congress intended the omission.  Id. 
at 512 (citing Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2009)).  Dean considered mens rea 
only in the context of two of § 924(c)(1)(A)’s provisions, which the Court held were sentencing 
factors.  Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853.  In her dissent, Judge Rogers also argued that a statute’s silence 
on the mens rea issue is not necessarily indicative of congressional intent to exclude a mens rea 
requirement.  Burwell, 690 F.3d at 520 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1978)).  Rogers implied that Congress may have 
declined to include an explicit mens rea requirement because it presumed that the statute would be 
construed in light of the established mens rea presumption.  Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).  The 
majority’s argument ignored both the six-fold increase in penalty for using a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (imposing a thirty-year penalty, six times the ten-year penalty found in § 
921(c)(1) (2006)), and the “moral depravity” in choosing to use a machinegun to facilitate a crime, 
see United States v. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2178 (2010) (“The immense danger posed by 
machineguns, the moral depravity in choosing the weapon, and the substantial increase in the 
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unwittingly choose an automatic weapon without understanding the full 
implications of his choice and therefore be unfairly subjected to a thirty-year 
minimum prison sentence.120  Additionally, given the array of guns falling 
within the definition of a machinegun, the machinegun provision could even 
apply to a defendant who actively attempted to avoid using a qualifying 
weapon.121  While Judge Kavanaugh’s arguments likely fail to overcome the 
“some plain indication” standard for congressional intent, they still resonate on 
the fairness of such a harsh penalty without requiring mens rea for the firearm 
type.122 
5.  Mens Rea Should Ensure That Offenders Are Punished Proportionally to 
the Level of Harm Inflicted 
Including a mens rea element in a crime’s definition ensures proportionate 
culpability—the notion that a person should be punished proportionally to his 
level of guilt.123  For example, in tort cases, an excessive penalty can rise to the 
level of an “arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property [under] the Due 
Process Clause.”124  In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court 
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits 
excessive punishment of tortfeasors.125  The Court held that imposing two 
million dollars in punitive damages in a case involving a car dealer that caused 
approximately four thousand dollars in actual damages was unconstitutionally 
excessive.126 
minimum sentence provided by the statute support the conclusion that this prohibition is an element 
of the crime, not a sentencing factor.”); Burwell, 690 F.3d at 519 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has twice stated that carrying a machinegun involves heightened culpability.”). 
 120. Burwell, 690 F.3d at 544 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (expressing concern with the 
possibility that an individual will be convicted under the machinegun provision even if the type of 
firearm was not apparent by simply looking at it); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 
613–14 (1994) (observing that a regulation applied to a firearm may be insufficient to put a 
possessor on notice of a penalty related to it). 
 121. See Burwell, 690 F.3d at 548 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is possible for 
the mechanism differentiating a machinegun from a semi-automatic weapon to break down, 
converting the semi-automatic weapon into a machinegun without the defendant’s knowledge); id. 
at 522 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 614–15 (1994)) (noting that a 
semiautomatic weapon can be converted into a machinegun intentionally, or by wear and tear 
without the defendant’s knowledge, thus making the carrying of the machinegun entirely innocent). 
 122. See id. at 544. 
 123. See Brown, supra note 23, at 114 (explaining that attaching mens rea to an element “links 
punishment proportionately to culpability”); see also BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that there is constitutional importance in 
creating legal standards that limit a jury’s discretion in punishing wrongdoing so that both the trial 
judge and the reviewing appellate court have adequate authority to ensure reasonable and rational 
punishment). 
 124. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 586 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 125. See id. at 562. 
 126. Id. at 562–64. 
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In Flores-Figueroa, the Supreme Court used similar reasoning in the criminal 
context.127  The Court examined an identity theft statute and concluded that the 
term “knowingly” applied to all elements of the crime following the placement 
of the term, not just to the element immediately succeeding the knowledge 
requirement.128  In his concurrence, Justice Alito explained that the Court’s 
holding required proof of knowledge of all of the statute’s elements because 
imposing an additional penalty on an already culpable offender should not 
“depend[] on chance.”129  As Judge Kavanaugh reasoned in Burwell, Flores-
Figueroa can represent the Court’s willingness to infer a mens rea requirement 
from criminal statutes to ensure proportionate punishment.130 
D.  A Mens Rea Requirement is Valuable from an Economic Perspective 
A statute’s deterrent purpose should not be interpreted as automatically 
displacing the culpability principle, which is protected by a mens rea 
requirement.131  Rather, mens rea should be omitted only if there is evidence that 
dispensing with the requirement more effectively deters criminal conduct.132  An 
economic analysis provides a useful lens through which to examine mens rea’s 
deterrent effect.133  Economic analysis of criminal law is predicated on the idea 
that economic theory helps to promote more efficient criminal law doctrines.134  
“Efficiency” in relation to criminal law usually refers to the outcome sought by 
optimal-enforcement theory.135  Optimal-enforcement theory states that crime 
may be reduced (deterred) to its “optimal level” by manipulating the 
 127. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1893–94 (2009). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1896 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 130. See United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1459 (2013); see also Brown, supra note 23, at 110 (arguing 
that Flores-Figueroa stands for the principle that “not applying a statute’s requirement of 
knowledge to all elements is inconsistent with [a] heavy penalty”). 
 131. See Burwell, 690 F.3d at 512–15 (considering traditional factors of statutory 
interpretation, such as the purpose of a statute, its language, its structure, and its context). 
 132. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that a fair justice system balances 
efficiency and culpability to ensure that only those deserving punishment are punished). 
 133. See Posner, supra note 22, at 1206. 
 134. Id. at 1194.  Gary Becker was the first to enunciate this theory.  Id. at 1193 (citing Gary 
S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)).  Becker 
intended to use economics to determine resource allocation for the criminal justice system.  Becker, 
supra, at 170.  Becker theorized that it was possible to use economic tools to determine the optimal 
level of harm society could withstand and subsequently calibrate resources—such as police 
power—and punishment levels to reach that level of harm.  Id. 
 135. See Posner, supra note 22, at 1195.  Criminal acts are inefficient because they take 
resources away from those who can put them to their best use.  Id. at 1196.  In other words, crime 
bypasses the marketplace by facilitating wealth transfers without payment, thereby transferring 
resources from someone who values them more to someone who values them less, evidenced by 
their refusal to pay for them.  Id. 
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probabilities that an offender will be caught and convicted.136  Essentially, the 
theory seeks to minimize a crime’s harm to society by efficiently allocating the 
finite resources available to law enforcement and the judiciary.137 
However, optimal-enforcement theory makes two controversial assumptions 
that ultimately limit the model’s utility.  Optimal-enforcement theory assumes 
that all individuals are rational actors who seek to maximize their own utility 
and who engage in a fully informed cost/benefit analysis before deciding 
whether to undertake a particular action.138  Behavioral economic theory 
criticizes these assumptions and consequently predicates its economic models 
on a different set of assumptions derived from psychological and sociological 
studies of human behavior.139  Therefore, it is necessary to consider mens rea’s 
role in deterrence under both the optimal-enforcement and behavioral economic 
theories. 
II.  LAW AND ECONOMICS THEORIES SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF A MENS REA 
REQUIREMENT IN THE MACHINEGUN PROVISION TO SERVE ITS DETERRENT 
PURPOSE 
A.  Under Optimal-Enforcement Theory, Mens Rea Facilitates the Deterrent 
Purpose of a Statute 
Optimal-enforcement theory provides a means of analysis to determine the 
optimal level of sanctions for a particular crime.140  However, establishing and 
implementing such sanctions precisely is daunting and costly.141  As a result, 
some economists claim that the criminal justice system skews toward imposing 
high, roughly determined penalties to deter and punish crime.142  Critics suggest 
 136. See Parker, supra note 19, at 743.  According to optimal-enforcement theory, the optimal 
level of crime occurs “where the total social costs of crime and punishment together are 
minimized.”  Id.  Optimal-enforcement theory attempts to engender a scenario in which the least 
amount of money is spent to produce the greatest amount of prevention of harm.  Id. 
 137. Posner, supra note 22, at 1196.  Economists consider harm in the criminal context a 
reduction of society’s overall wealth.  See id. at 1197-98.  For example, killing someone reduces 
society’s overall wealth by eliminating the contributions the victim may have made.  Id.  Robbery 
or burglary harms society by forcing people to spend money to protect themselves from loss that 
could have been spent to produce something useful or beneficial.  Id. at 1198.  Posner refers to 
these crimes as “pure coercive transfers of wealth.”  Id. at 1196. 
 138. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). 
 139. See Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics 
3–4 (U. Chi. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 244, 2008), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/244-440_0.pdf. 
 140. Parker, supra note 19, at 743. 
 141. Id. at 754.  Unlike other sciences, it is difficult to create experiments to determine how 
manipulating the factors affecting the probability of catching and convicting a criminal increases 
or decreases deterrence.  Id.  For example, police departments are unlikely to be receptive to an 
economist dictating the number of officers on the streets at a given time in order to test how many 
more (or fewer) officers are necessary to deter crime by one percent. 
 142. Id. at 754. 
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that, although these penalties may still efficiently deter crime, they create an 
information-cost problem because individuals will expend unnecessary 
resources to avoid breaking the law.143 
Studies addressing the role mens rea plays in an optimal-enforcement 
economic analysis of crime are relatively scarce.144  Some scholars suggest that 
mens rea may operate as a proxy for “the offender’s responsiveness to 
punishment, the probability the offender will be detected, or the expected harm 
of the criminal act.”145  However, one proponent of optimal enforcement theory 
suggests that these proxy theories inadequately explain mens rea’s role and 
instead argues that mens rea reduces a potential offender’s likelihood to gather 
“self-characterizing information,” thus affecting the offender’s analysis of the 
probability that he will be caught and convicted if he commits the crime.146  In 
either case, a mens rea requirement corrects the information-cost problem 
associated with roughly determined penalties by imposing a ceiling on the 
amount of information a person must gather to avoid being convicted of a 
crime.147 
For general intent crimes, a mens rea requirement “is designed to ensure that 
an actor possesses self-characterizing information without having invested 
anything in the attainment of that information.”148  In other words, optimal 
enforcement theory supports the notion that a mens rea requirement ensures that 
 143. Id. at 754, 772–73.  Parker argues that high sanctions cause people to overinvest in 
gathering and processing information to determine whether they will be caught and be punished.  
Id.  Although this appears to be a positive evaluation—as no crime is generally considered to be 
the optimal level of crime—many individuals will expend considerable time and effort, which could 
be spent far more productively, to avoid punishment.  See id. at 773.  Consider a situation in which 
jaywalking is punished by five years in prison.  As a result of this penalty, a few people might 
jaywalk, but many more would invest significant amounts of time and effort to avoid the five-year 
penalty, ultimately an inefficient use of that time.  See id. (citing a similar example involving a 
death penalty for violating the speed limit). 
 144. Id. at 743. 
 145. Id. at 744.  Judge Posner offers another theory, positing that the intent requirement deters 
crime by identifying those who intend to engage in prohibited behavior and thereby affecting the 
probability of conviction and future action.  Posner, supra note 22, at 1221 (suggesting that the 
intent requirement serves three economic functions: “[1] identifying pure coercive transfer,  
[2] estimating the probability of apprehension and conviction, and [3] determining whether the 
criminal sanction will be an effective (cost-justified) means of controlling undesirable conduct”). 
Posner’s theory is concerned with specific intent instead of knowledge and therefore falls outside 
the scope of this Comment. 
 146. Parker, supra note 19, at 745–46 (defining “self-characterizing information” as 
information the offender has about himself and his actions). 
 147. Id. at 746.  Lowering the severity of a sanction decreases its deterrent effect, resulting in 
increased social harm.  Id. at 757.  For any given level of punishment, a certain percentage of the 
population is willing to engage in a particular undesirable behavior.  Id. at 757–58.  The higher the 
penalty for the behavior, the lower the percentage of people willing to engage in it, due to the 
increased cost that it incurs. Id. 
 148. Id. at 769. 
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only the culpable are punished, and thereby promotes efficient allocation of 
judicial resources and reduces information costs to the public.149 
Accordingly, strict liability should be imposed only if the cost of gathering 
information is high and the harm resulting from the behavior is easily 
foreseeable.150  If the magnitude of harm—including the possibility of wrongful 
conviction—is indeterminate, mens rea should be required because, in this 
situation, the criminal justice system will most likely inefficiently deter criminal 
conduct.151  A mens rea requirement resolves this problem by ensuring that only 
the culpable are convicted.152 
B.  Under Behavioral Economic Theory, Mens Rea Also Facilitates the 
Deterrent Purpose of a Statute 
Behavioral economic theory builds upon the optimal-enforcement theory 
model by modifying its assumptions to more accurately reflect human 
behavior.153  Behavioral economists assume that individuals make systematic 
mistakes.154  For example, people tend to be more optimistic about their own 
prospects for success than they are about the average person’s.155  Behavioral 
economists also find that, rather than rationally weighing costs and benefits, 
most people act impulsively and without knowledge of the precise legal 
consequences of their actions.156  Similarly, economists suggest that people are 
much more confident about the accuracy of their predictions than their 
postdictions.157 
Given these assumptions, behavioral economists suggest that an offender’s 
optimistic nature regarding his chances of being caught, coupled with the 
likelihood that he does not understand the possible consequence of his actions, 
negatively affect an offender’s ability to predict whether he will be convicted 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. at 770–71; see also Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 
1524 (1984). 
 151. See generally Cooter, supra note 150, at 1526–30 (explaining how the allocation of costs 
and resources affects the level of precaution a potential offender will take for a given action). 
 152. See Parker, supra note 19, at 809–10. 
 153. See Jolls, supra note 22, at 1473–74 (explaining that behavioral economics seeks to 
“model and predict behavior relevant to law with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but 
with more accurate assumptions about human behavior”).  Behavioral economists consult 
behavioral observations from sociological or psychological research to better reflect behavioral 
outcomes, and thus to better identify methods by which to deter undesirable behavior.  Id. at 1474. 
 154. See McAdams & Ulen, supra note 139, at 4 (noting that people make systematic, decisive 
mistakes “away from the predictions of rational choice theory”). 
 155. Id. at 4–5 (explaining that people tend to rely on the status quo to predict future outcomes, 
especially if it is consistent with their beliefs). 
 156. Id. at 13–15 (reporting empirical results indicating that people generally fail to calculate 
the consequences of their behavior and do not generally know of or consider potential 
punishments). 
 157. Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Predictions and Legal 
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 469 (2008). 
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and what punishment he will receive if he is.158  The presence of a mens rea 
requirement increases a potential perpetrator’s uncertainty about the outcome of 
his criminal actions.159 
Some proponents of behavioral economic theory suggest that incorporating 
mens rea into the elements of a crime “allows for past uncertainty.”160  
Therefore, any conjecture relating to the effect of mens rea on actual liability 
involves postdiction instead of prediction.161  Conversely, strict liability 
completely removes mens rea from the equation, which decreases past 
uncertainty and thus makes it easier for potential perpetrators to predict the 
outcome of their actions.162  Postdiction generally produces a greater deterrent 
effect than prediction because individuals are less confident about their 
postdictions.163  Therefore, according to behavioral economic theory, including 
a mens rea requirement in a crime’s definition increases past uncertainty, which 
requires postdiction and is therefore more likely to deter crime.164 
 158. See id. at 491–92; see also Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 415, 425 (2007) (“Strict liability . . . becomes appealing only when two conditions are met: 
first, the market renders ignorance costless for potential offenders; second, ignorance is not socially 
optimal.”). 
 159. Guttel & Harel, supra note 157, at 493, 496–97 (describing additional situations in which 
increasing uncertainty in turn increases deterrence, such as broad or discretionary sentencing 
schemes and statutes that impose liability for actions of co-conspirators. 
 160. Id. at 493. 
 161. See id. (“The requirement of mens rea . . . does not presuppose certainty concerning 
existing circumstances, but only understanding of the possibility that the relevant circumstances 
may apply.”).  Guttel and Harel discuss the effect of mens rea on property crimes for which the 
severity of the sentence “depends on the value of the object stolen.”  Id. at 494.  They note that the 
perpetrator’s consideration of his chances of success will involve postdiction because the factors 
relevant on which the severity of his sentence depends are already established at the time the 
perpetrator commits the crime.  Id. 
 162. See Guttel & Harel, supra note 157, at 493–97.  It is easier to predict outcomes under a 
strict liability regime because the government does not need to prove intent at trial.  See Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994). 
 163. See Guttel & Harel, supra note 157, at 497. 
 164. See supra notes 157–63 and accompanying text.  Conversely, some argue that mens rea 
may actually deter offenders from gathering necessary information about their behavior in order to 
be able to claim ignorance if caught.  See Hamdani, supra note 158, at 425–26 (claiming that 
“[m]ens rea discourages potential offenders from obtaining valuable information concerning 
offense elements, whereas strict liability produces optimal incentives to obtain such information”).  
However, in some instances, it is too “expensive” to not gather circumstantial information before 
committing a crime; in those cases, mens rea discourages the criminal conduct.  Id. at 433–34.  
Choosing to carry a machinegun is a situation in which the cost of ignorance is very high, due to 
the danger using a machinegun poses to its carrier.  Id. at 433–34 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at  
612–13). 
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III.  THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT A DEFENDANT 
KNEW HIS FIREARM WAS A MACHINEGUN 
Because criminal punishment is a reflection of social condemnation, only 
deserving individuals should be punished.165  Requiring proof of mens rea is the 
primary means to ensure that only those who deserve to be punished are actually 
punished and that the punishment is proportionate to their level of culpability.166  
Courts are required to identify some indication of congressional intent to 
overcome the mens rea presumption, except if the statute would criminalize 
otherwise innocent behavior.167  Congress did not explicitly include a mens rea 
requirement in § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), nor did it explicitly indicate intent to dispose 
of the requirement; therefore the inquiry is limited to whether Congress 
implicitly intended to exclude mens rea from the machinegun provision.168 
To convict a defendant under the machinegun provision, the government must 
prove that the defendant possessed a machinegun in furtherance of a violent or 
drug-related crime.169  Under § 924(c)’s basic provision, the government must 
prove that the defendant intended to knowingly possess a firearm to facilitate a 
crime he intended to commit.170  The only difference in the government’s burden 
of proof under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) is that, under the 
machinegun provision, the government must prove that the type of firearm the 
defendant possessed was a machinegun or one of the other listed weapons.171 
Under the current interpretations of the machinegun provision, it is not clear 
whether courts must attach a mens rea requirement to the firearm-type element 
of the machinegun provision.  Some courts have assumed that the provision 
requires mens rea.172  Others have held that mens rea is not required because 
some of the statutory interpretation factors indicate congressional intent to 
 165. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (discussing mens rea and its purpose to 
ensure that only those who are culpable are punished). 
 166. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 167. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)). 
 168. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (lacking an explicit mens rea requirement); 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (noting that congressional intent may be express 
or implied). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (B)(ii) (2006). 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 171. Compare id. (proscribing the use, carrying, or possession of a firearm during or in 
furtherance of a crime), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (proscribing the use, carrying, or 
possession of a machinegun during or in furtherance of a crime). 
 172. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003) (assuming that 
knowledge of the type of firearm is required because, based on the specific facts of the case, it was 
clear to the court that the defendant knew he had used a machinegun); United States v. Rodriguez, 
54 F. App’x 739, 747 (3d Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636, 640–41 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (same). 
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forego requiring mens rea for the firearm’s characteristics.173  Additional 
authorities have rejected this argument, basing the mens rea analysis on the 
balancing of the statute’s deterrent purpose intended by Congress and the 
inherent fairness of subjecting a defendant to a thirty-year penalty.174 
Economic theory suggests that including a mens rea requirement for the 
firearm-type element serves the deterrent purpose of the statute.175  Both 
optimal-enforcement theory and behavioral economic theory reach the same 
conclusion, despite the differences in their basic assumptions.  Optimal-
enforcement theory suggests that the criminal justice system tends to over-deter 
criminal activity by imposing harsher-than-necessary penalties, making a mens 
rea requirement necessary to efficiently deter crime by preventing accidental 
violations of the law.176  Under optimal-enforcement theory, the machinegun 
provision’s harsh penalty, triggered solely by the firearm’s characteristic,177 is 
evidence that the provision should have a corresponding mens rea requirement 
in order to reach an efficient result. 
Behavioral economic theory suggests a similar result.  Behavioral economics 
indicate that including a mens rea requirement for the firearm-characteristic 
element will increase the potential offender’s uncertainty, therefore requiring 
that he postdict, rather than predict, whether he will be convicted.178  A mens 
rea standard is appropriate in situations in which the cost of information is low 
and it is difficult to predict the amount of social harm that will result from the 
criminal conduct.179  Under the machinegun provision, the cost of determining 
the type of firearm is relatively low because the evaluation requires only the 
inspection or firing of the weapon.180  Conversely, it is difficult to predict the 
actual harm that will result from carrying, much less firing, a machinegun; the 
harm may be confined to panic or fear on the part of witnesses, or it may involve 
loss of life, which carries a significantyl higher social cost.  Furthermore, a 
 173. See, e.g., Burwell, 690 F.3d at 516; United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 
2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1723 (2013); United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 
812 (8th Cir. 2006) (predicating its holding on the fact that the type of firearm is a sentencing 
factor); United States v. Eads, 191 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 174. See supra notes 115–22 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Kavanaugh’s and Judge 
Rogers’s dissenting opinions in Burwell). 
 175. See Parker, supra note 19, at 762–63 (arguing that both optimal-enforcement theory and 
behavioral economic theory reach the same conclusion). 
 176. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text (explaining that the criminal justice 
system tends to impose harsher penalties because of the amount of resources and level of precision 
required to otherwise structure an effective punishment scheme). 
 177. See Burwell, 690 F.3d at 529 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the 
machinegun provision imposes “[t]wenty extra years of mandatory imprisonment”). 
 178. See Guttel & Harel, supra note 157, at 498 (describing the benefits of postdict evaluation). 
 179. See Parker, supra note 19, at 770–71. 
 180. See North Carolina Gun Ownership FAQs, supra note 90 (explaining that machinegun 
fire is distinctive and, consequently, that firing the weapon will notify the user that he is using a 
machinegun). 
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machinegun may be dangerous to the offender himself, especially if the offender 
is unaware that the firearm is in fact a machinegun.181  Both factors support the 
inclusion of a mens rea requirement. 
Some scholars suggest that strict liability is a more effective deterrent than 
requiring mens rea because the government does not need to prove the offender’s 
intent.182  To the contrary, behavioral economists suggest that potential 
offenders are relatively optimistic about their chances of successfully 
committing a crime and fail to realize the severity of the potential penalty for 
their conduct.183  A thirty-year sentence is not a deterrent if the potential offender 
is unaware of the penalty. 
Similarly, imposing a penalty six times greater for carrying a machinegun than 
the five-year penalty imposed for carrying a pistol must depend on more than 
chance.184  As Judge Kavanaugh explained in Burwell, the Supreme Court has 
not definitively endorsed a threshold eligibility theory for imposing criminal 
penalties.185  There is a well-ingrained tradition in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
of requiring some degree of consistency with the common law mens rea 
presumption in situations in which Congress has not required otherwise.186  The 
Court’s implicit reasoning in Flores-Figureoa indicates that it is not inconsistent 
with the current state of the law to attach a mens rea requirement to the firearm-
type element of the machinegun provision to ensure that a defendant who was 
unaware that the firearm he carried was a machinegun is punished proportionally 
to his level of culpability.187  Additionally, attaching a mens rea requirement to 
the firearm-type element will prevent the arbitrary deprivation of liberty that 
could result from imposing a minimum thirty-year sentence for conduct that, 
under slightly different circumstances, could only warrant a five-year penalty.188 
 181. See Hamdani, supra note 158, at 433–34 (noting that ignorance is particularly detrimental  
in cases in which there is a risk to personal safety by the failure to acquire knowledge). 
 182. See id. at 422 (explaining that strict liability is a better deterrent because “the subjective 
nature of mens rea and the heavy standard of proof in criminal trials increase the probability that 
courts [will] err in favor of defendants . . . [s]trict liability, in contrast, reduces the likelihood of 
such errors”).  Strict liability is favorable to some because it can either induce possible perpetrators 
to either take greater precaution in their criminal actions or discourage criminal activity altogether).  
Id. at 423–25.  However, these justifications tend to fail.  Id. 
 183. See supra notes 158 and accompanying text.  But see Hamdani, supra note 158, at 423 
(“[T]he claim that it is substantially more challenging to prove defendants’ awareness of those 
offense elements governed by strict liability is often inaccurate.”). 
 184. Flores-Figureoa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1896 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 185. Burwell v. United States, 690 F.3d 500, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1459 (2013) (alluding to the proportionate culpability theory). 
 186. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the common law mens rea presumption). 
 187. Brown, supra note 23, at 110 (arguing that Flores-Figureoa “endorsed” the proportionate 
culpability theory). 
 188. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (imposing a mandatory thirty-year 
sentence), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (imposing a mandatory five-year sentence).  See 
supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text (discussing the due process concerns related to 
excessive or disproportionate punishment). 
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Therefore, when analyzing whether to require proof that a defendant knew the 
type of firearm he possessed or carried during the underlying crime, future courts 
should weigh the statutory purpose and proportionate culpability concern, which 
strongly favor inferring the requirement.  Furthermore, Congress should 
consider revising the machinegun provision to include an explicit mens rea 
requirement for the firearm-type element to resolve the question entirely.  
Specifically, the machinegun provision should read: “If the firearm possessed 
by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection . . . is a machinegun . . . 
and the person has knowledge of the characteristics that bring the firearm within 
this provision, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
less than 30 years.”189  Congress should also include a definition for “knows” in 
Section 924(c)(1), and should adopt the Model Penal Code’s definition of the 
term.190  By taking both of these steps, Congress will clearly indicate its intent 
to include a mens rea requirement in the machinegun provision.  Redefining the 
crime in this manner will efficiently balance Congress’s deterrent intent  with 
the fundamental fairness concerns that the mens rea presumption was 
constructed to address. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although the machinegun provision was intended to deter crime, it should 
balance deterrence goals with retributive principles by only punishing the 
culpable.  As currently written, the sole differentiating factor between the 
machinegun provision, § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), and § 924(c)’s basic offense,  
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), is the firearm-type element.  The extreme discrepancy 
between the sentences these provisions impose necessitates a mens rea 
requirement for the firearm-type element in the machinegun provision, pursuant 
to proportional culpability theory.  Economic theory also supports the inclusion 
of a mens rea requirement in the machinegun provision to deter potential 
offenders.  By imposing a mens rea requirement, Congress could maintain the 
provision’s deterrent purpose as well as ensure proportionate culpability.  
Therefore, to balance deterrence and fairness the machinegun provision 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) should include a knowledge requirement. 
 
 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (proposed language italicized). 
 190. According to the Model Penal Code, 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is 
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain 
that his conduct will cause such a result. 
MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(2)(b). 
                                                 
